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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A STUDY ASSESSING IMPACTS OF NEW REGULATORY PROPOSALS ON 
CYCLICALITY OF CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS: CASE OF CZECH REPUBLIC 
 
By 
 
Michal Bartůsek 
 
This work focuses on new regulatory proposals, primarily Basel III accords and analyzes its 
ability to create a buffer for recurrent credit bubbles.  Research by Lis, Pagés and Saurina 
[2000] has illustrated the  cyclicality of loan growth and GDP growth for Spain. These 
economists argued that the current financial system created credit bubbles, which the current 
banking regulation Basel II supported due to its cyclicality. In this paper, following their 
research, we examine the ability of new regulatory proposals such as Basel III, statistical 
provisions and change in the approach to the probability of default, to cope with recurrent 
credit bubbles. According to our critical assessment, Basel III may not be able to create 
sufficient capital buffer for exceptional credit bubbles such as the current one. This buffer 
suggested by Basel III has several drawbacks which may decrease its functionality. Statistical 
provision is not an appropriate measure, because it could weaken the fair and true view of 
financial statements principle. Change in approach to probability of default seems to be 
rational and effective. The only issue may relate to its recovery mechanisms. It doesn’t 
support economic growth in time of economic recession. The author’s proposal of new 
countercyclical buffer, which would be based on credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth to loan 
growth gap is introduced at the end of this work. Although this measure may have negative 
impact on GDP growth, it may create an appropriate buffer to systematic credit risk.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The current financial crisis has become the largest financial crisis since the Great 
Depression in 1929 and it has triggered an extensive discussion about causes of a recurring 
financial crisis and related bank regulation. There is a large spectrum of causes such as 
excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage, erosion of the level and quality of the capital 
base, insufficient liquidity buffer 1 , interconnection of systematic institutions and their 
complex transactions, credit and asset price bubbles etc. One of the main causes undoubtedly 
is systematic credit bubbles. Despite the continuing current financial crisis and its spillover 
into real economy, leading to another round of financial crisis, many economists already 
discuss regulatory proposals which should be implemented after the end of this crisis.  
Credit bubbles have large mostly negative impact on society. Credit bubbles strengthen the 
economic cycle. People, due to positive future prospect and asset prices increase, take out 
new loans to invest or consume. Those new loans leverage significantly the whole economy. 
In the period of economic downturn, the deleveraging spiral plunges the economy to even 
deeper recession. Deep recession brings a higher rate of unemployment which is 
interconnected with higher level of suicides2 and higher number of homeless people. The 
lives of many inhabitants are threatened or totally ruined by such a rapid increase in 
unemployment and wage cuts, since they have to keep repaying their consumer or mortgage 
loans. Unemployed people are also significantly unhappier than the employed based on 
research done by Ohtake [2012]. Another research by Tversky and Kahnemann [1991] shows 
that people react more sensitively to losses than to gains. Based on this notion, credit bubbles 
harm society and therefore, there should be created a special buffer for credit bubbles in order 
to eliminate their impact. 
Research done by Saurina, Lis, Pagés [2000] has proven cyclicality of loans and GDP for 
Spain. Following their research, the goal of this work is to discuss and assess current and new 
regulatory proposals related to credit bubbles.  
In the first step we present expected and unexpected credit risk and current regulatory 
approach to those risks. Further, we introduce briefly Basel II, Basel III and statistical 
provision of regulation in order to lay the foundations of further assessment of new regulation. 
Countercyclical buffer and conservation buffer are discussed in deep, because those two 
                                                     
1 Banks doesn’t take into account increasing maturity mismatch. 
2 Rate of suicides in Greece doubled during current financial crisis.[Kirschbaum (Reuters),2012] 
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measures directly target credit bubbles. Basel II should make regulatory capital charges on 
rising unexpected risk during economic boom and vice versa. As Lis, Pagés, Saurina [2000] 
as well as other economists show, Basel II doesn’t create buffer for unsystematic credit risk, 
because it is not countercyclical. This is why; the new Basel III and its countercyclical and 
conservation buffer are introduced. So new regulatory measures will be critically discussed 
and their strengths and weaknesses will be identified. At the end of the paper I propose a 
different approach to the countercyclical buffer as the most important countercyclical 
measure in Basel III accords.  
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1. The banking business 
1.1. Description and specification of the banking business 
Banking has completely changed its form and functions throughout its history moving 
from storing valuables to intermediation of funds. However, nowadays there are also other 
services provided by banks such as liquidity insurance [Bryant, 1980; Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983], reduction of participation costs [Allen and Santomero, 1997] and facilitation of risk 
transfer [Allen and Santomero, 1997]. The list of services is constantly expanding due to the 
remarkable development in financial services. Those new services are for instance derivatives, 
letters of credit and guarantees. Thus the banking business has become much more 
complicated than ever before. Globalization and internationalization of financial services 
created more competitive and internationally interconnected markets and brought new 
challenges for financial institution in areas of operational risk, new instruments and handling 
more complicated rating models. Financial intermediary sector has grown substantially in 
past years and debt to GDP increased from 167% in 1980 to 314% in 2011 [Cecchetti, 
Mohanty, Zampolli]. This incredible growth brought new issues such as systematic 
importance of some institutions. Those institutions have become too big to fail which require 
bailouts in times of financial troubles. Bank bailouts burden state budgets and give a 
sufficient justification for tighter regulation of financial institutions. Despite costs associated 
with the crisis, economists argue that a well-developed financial system contributes to 
economic growth. They believe that the efficient allocation of capital increases economic 
growth [Levine, 1997]. 
The banking business is special in comparison with the production or other service 
businesses. The most important are presumably the two following differences. Compared to 
other businesses, banks are highly leveraged (trade primarily with client’s deposits)3 and in 
most cases conclude long-term contracts4 by using primarily short term financing. According 
to economic theory banking is much more exposed to principal agent problem, adverse 
selection problem and imperfect or asymmetric information [Scholtens and Wensveen, 2003]. 
                                                     
3 Default risk - In most of businesses, company produce its product with its own funds and final product sell to 
client. There are similar businesses such as developers, house construction companies, which builds its houses 
with client’s money and default risk plays important role. Due to this fact clients are vulnerable to any kind of 
bad news about its financial institution. 
4 Banking institutions finance in many cases long term project with high level of uncertainty (mortgages, 
investment loans). As a source of funding are used short term deposits. This trend creates maturity mismatch 
and increase in liquidity risk. 
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There are two types of informational asymmetry; informational asymmetry between 
bank/borrower and between bank/lender. The former relates to the selection of borrowers to 
which the bank will provide a loan.  The bank is highly motivated to attract borrowers with 
the lowest probability of default or in other words with high creditworthiness. Problematic 
areas of bank/borrower relation are first screening of borrower prior to providing a loan and 
his monitoring throughout the repayment period. First screening is executed by credit risk 
managers and lawyers who select a client based on several criteria. Those are the client’s 
financial situation and cash flow prospect, creditworthiness (checking register of debtors), 
legal issues related to client and pledges on client’s tangible and intangible assets. The 
borrower looking for the best interest rates is incentivized to hide negative shortcomings of 
his business or increase the value of available collateral in order to receive better interest 
rates. Moreover, there appears to be also an adverse selection issue. By increasing the interest 
rate the bank attracts mostly borrowers with high-risk projects and worse creditworthiness, 
who are willing to pay this interest and who cannot receive credit elsewhere5.  This is a 
similar problem to the one presented in insurance business by Siegelman [2004]. 
 The issue of imperfect or asymmetric information causing bank runs appears to be central 
for the bank/lender relationship. The significance of this issue is documented by many 
economists who analyze and come with solution to bank runs and their prevention [Diamond 
and Dybvig, 1983]. Banks are trading with client’s money, while individual depositor costs to 
control bank??? are too high. Depositors then rely on deposit insurance provided by the 
Deposit insurance fund. Deposits compensation is paid to 100% of the deposit amount and 
the maximum compensation amount is EUR 100,000 per client per bank. The Deposit 
insurance fund in the Czech Republic administers only CZK 21.8 billion. Up to now the fund 
has paid out depositors in 16 cases totaling CZK 25.5 billion. In case of medium or large 
bank default, the deposit insurance fund would not likely be able to meet its obligations. 
All this specific bank issues make banks to be highly exposed to various risks. Because of the 
various risks in the banking business, managing and trading risks is thought to be the most 
important activity. It makes a key difference between successful and unsuccessful bank 
institutions.  
                                                     
5 Borrowers with low creditworthiness borrow funds in smaller institutions, for instance in saving unions 
(Saving unions have to accept borrowers with lower creditworthiness, because they can hardly compete to 
bigger banks by interest rate due to lower savings related to economy of scale. 
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This thesis focuses on the banking business and credit bubbles, because the banking 
business plays the most important role in the Czech financial market. Banks in the Czech 
Republic hold 91 % of all assets in the Czech financial sector. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of financial institutions 
 
Source: own made graph, data from CNB website 
Czech Banks as well as their clients are very conservative in their strategy and approach to 
new products. This is the main reason for  the high portion of loans in the balance sheets of 
Czech banks. This makes bank highly exposed to economic cycle and credit bubbles. For 
more details, see the consolidated balance sheet of the Czech banking sector in Appendix D. 
1.2. Risks in the banking business 
In this chapter we will briefly discuss the basic issue of regulation, which is regulation of 
risk taking behavior. On the one hand, regulators want a bank to be prudent and risk averse. 
This behavior would contribute to its stability. However, at the same time regulators don’t 
want to harm the banking business. Banks and regulators then solve the question how  
prudent risk management should be. Risks accompany any kind of human activity. There are 
hundreds of risks in our life. Those are mostly risks of damage to our health or property. In 
ordinary life people deal with those risks by using insurance, lowering the probability of 
occurrence or eliminating occurred damages. 
On the financial markets the risks are financial. Financial institutions deal with these risks 
as ordinary people do. As in life in finance, ignoring risks can also be fatal. On the other hand, 
any endeavor to fully eliminate all risks is either too expensive or just impossible. However, 
there is an important difference between risks in life and in finance. There is a difference in 
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the carrier of risk and the risk taker. In the case of human life we are risk takers and at the 
same time also carriers of risks 6 . On the other hand, in the case of finance, financial 
companies take risks, but the real carriers of risks are depositors and investors. In the case of 
our life, we risk our life. Financial institutions risk mostly depositor’s money. Those funds 
are insured up to a limit, causing moral hazard as a result of monitoring ignorance of 
depositors [Hooks and Robinson, 2002]. Hooks and Robinson studied the impact of deposit 
insurance in Texas on risk taking behavior of banks. Based on the result of regression 
analysis they concluded that the part of the moral hazard implicated by deposit insurance can 
explain only a part of risk taking behavior. Their results may be affected by rational 
ignorance of depositors. Generally, depositors would most likely not monitor banks anyway, 
as they are not provided with sufficient information, knowledge and incentive to incur costs 
that are too high. 
Financial risk is defined as a potential loss of a subject. There are expected and 
unexpected losses. The expected loss is defined as an already existing loss. On the other hand, 
the unexpected loss represents potential loss.  
There are five groups of financial risks. Those are credit, market, liquidity, operational and 
business risks. However, the main objective of this thesis is to assess the ability of new 
regulatory proposals to create sufficient capital buffer on unexpected credit risk. Therefore 
credit risk will be further introduced in the next section. 
1.2.1. Credit risk 
In general credit risk is a risk of counterparty failure. Counterparty failure means that the 
partner is not able to meet their signed contract and thus they cause a loss to their creditor. 
These partner’s liabilities can originate from credit, business or investment activities. As 
described above there are expected and unexpected losses. This split is very important due to 
the fact that the bank institution creates loan-loss provisions on existing losses7. Unexpected 
losses should be taken into account fully in capital requirements [Jílek, 2000]. Loan loss 
provisions are created based on loan classification. Loan classification depends on the 
number of days overdue or economic results of the borrower. For the classification see the 
table below. 
 
                                                     
6 There are exceptions – for instance bus drivers (in this case bus driver is responsible not just for himself but 
also for other passengers. 
7 Those loan-loss provisions are cyclical to GDP and unemployment. causing credit bubbles 
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Table 1 Loan-loss provision – CNB classification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CNB webpage www.cnb.cz 
 
Calculation of loan loss provisions for watched loans 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Calculation of provisions for Non-standard loans, Doubtful loans and Loss loans 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = [(𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 − 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙) ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡] + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 
 
Unexpected losses can occur from unexpected events such as economic downturn. 
Personally, I consider economic downturn as an expected event, because it always occurs in 
determinable time horizon. However, in the sense of accounting principles, economic 
downturn does not come regularly or in the same extent, thus banks should not be making 
reserves for this event. In the graph below we can see that there was significant credit 
expansion in the Czech Republic in the last 8 years. It means an increase in unexpected credit 
risk. As was already discussed above, this risk should be taken into account by capital 
adequacy. However, there was no increase in the average capital adequacy of Czech banks 
during the economic boom from 2000-2007. This means that capital adequacy does not really 
take into account increase in unexpected credit risk. Increase in “failure on credit to total 
credits” is used to illustrate the worsening economic situation due to the onset of the current 
financial crisis. In conclusion, we can say that capital adequacy relates to default on credit 
increase. In my opinion, capital adequacy does not fulfill its role. Instead of creating a buffer 
for unexpected losses, capital buffer on credit risk is cyclical to GDP. Increase in GDP 
decreases the buffer and vice versa. 
 
  Overdue Amount of provisions 
Standard max. 30 days 0% 
Watched 31-90 days 1%-19.99% 
Non-standard 91-180 days 20-49.99% 
Doubtfull 181-360 days 50-99.99% 
Loss loan 361 - and more days 100% 
8 
 
Figure 2: Loans to GDP, credit failure and capital adequacy 
 
Source: data from CNB database own calculation,Database casovych rad ARAD  
 
As already mentioned, the financial sector grows tremendously compared to real economy 
due to an increase in on- and off-balance sheet leverage. This graph illustrates the amount of 
loans to GDP in the Czech Republic. It illustrates a massive loan expansion which can be 
either interpreted as a development of the financial market in the Czech Republic or as a 
creation of a small credit bubble or a kind of combination of both mentioned. The biggest 
issue for all regulators is to distinguish between stable growth of the financial market and 
asset or a credit bubble. Even in the case that central bankers would be sure that there is a 
credit bubble on the market, it would be very unpopular to try to burst it by increasing an 
interest rate. It would have a negative impact on economic growth and unemployment. 
Despite this, there are economists who think that the central bank should burst the assets or 
credit bubbles [Patel, 2009]. Patel argues that the low interest rates of central banks lead to 
bubbles, hence these interest rates encourage taking an excessive debt to buy assets as 
demonstrated during the housing bubble in the United States. By not bursting an asset bubble, 
the central bank creates a precedent of continuous asset price growth. This encourages market 
participants to bet on asset price growth development by buying new assets on credits, which 
leads to continuous leveraging of economy and creation of a credit bubble. Possibility of 
bursting a bubble if market value overwhelms an intrinsic value could lead market 
participants to cautious behavior and prevent excessive risk taking as experienced in the U.S.  
As I have already mentioned, bursting the bubble could plunge the economy into recession 
and cause significant damages which would be assigned to the central bank’s decision. Some 
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central banks would even have to break their main commitments by bursting a bubble. For 
instance FED has a dual objective of employment and stable prices. Bursting a credit bubble 
would decrease the employment rate and the central bank would fall short of its goals.  
Figure 2 also illustrates an increase in counterparty risk in the Czech Republic. Counterparty 
risk is a risk that a party to a contract fails to fully discharge the terms of contract. It emerges 
when a counterparty is not able to fulfill its obligation in time or in whole extent, due to 
which the bank is exposed to financial loss. Default on credits rate has increased between the 
years 2007-2010 by 3.3 percentage points and more than doubled. Default on credit is related 
to worsening CNB classification of portfolio which leads to increasing loan-loss provisions. 
This development is caused by the start of the financial crisis, which brought an increase in 
companies and households bankruptcies. 
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2. Credit bubbles 
In order to assess Basel III ability to cope with credit bubbles, i firstly we have to set 
determinants of credit bubbles. This part of the thesis is focused on credit bubbles and its 
determinants as a systematic cause of the current financial crisis [Lis, Pagés, Saurina, 2000]. 
Although, there are also other determinants and factors influencing credit growth, GDP is 
assumed to be one of the most significant.  
 
2.1. Determinants of credit bubbles 
According to Lis, Pagés, Saurina [2000] credit bubbles are driven by extensive credit 
growth. This credit growth has many causes. Probably the most important is cyclicality of 
credit growth and default on credit to GDP growth. However, there are also other factors 
influencing credit growth such as rules for remuneration management, credit agencies rating 
etc. 
Based on the study from Lis, Pagés, Saurina [2000] working for the Central bank of Spain, 
not only is that loan growth  cyclical to GDP growth, loan growth is even faster than GDP 
growth in time of economic boom and underperforming during an economic recession. Lis, 
Pagés, Saurina [2000] tested this hypothesis for Spain. As described in their paper, it can be 
explained by supply and demand factors. Bank loans do not finance only consumption and 
business investments, but also financial acquisitions, which are not part of GDP, but show 
strong cyclical patterns. The other factors are according to Lis, Pagés, Saurina [2000] also 
interest rate and relative prices. Relative prices of loans affect the demand for loans; since 
loans are deflated by the growth of CPI.  
The most important factor is bank lending policy. Bank lending depends heavily on 
economic growth as already discussed. In time of economic growth, probability of default 
decreases which has impact on expected as well as on unexpected risk. The graph below 
illustrates development of default on credit rate8. The amount of credit decreased during the 
boom from 6.4 % in 2003 to 2.6 % in 2007. This has had two consequences on expected as 
well as on unexpected risk. Expected risk is covered by loan provisions which are calculated 
as presented in section 1.2.1. Due to decrease in default on credit rate, banks had to create 
lower amount of loan provisions, which leads to higher profit and decrease in the price of 
lending. 
                                                     
8 Amount of loans classified as non-standard, doubtful and loss to total amount of loans 
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Figure 3: Default on credit compared to real GDP growth9 
 
Source: data from CNB database - own calculation,Database casovych rad ARAD and CSU 
  
On the other hand, decrease in default on credit rate also affects unexpected risk. Basel II 
calculates charges on credit risk by standard or IRB approach as discussed in 2.2.1. 
Probability of default is either based on credit rating agency or on internal estimation. 
However, in both cases probability of default depends strongly on macroeconomic conditions.  
 As it can be implied, expected as well as unexpected risk and its loan loss provisions 
and capital charges are depending on economic growth, which affects the probability of 
default. This is the source of problem, because capital charges on unexpected risk should 
create capital reserves for systematic risk such as credit bubbles. Probability of credit bubbles 
is increasing with length of economic growth and so capital charges should increase during 
this time. This is not the picture of reality, because as already explained, probability of 
default is decreasing during economic growth and so are the capital charges. This makes 
Basel II to be procyclical. 
  
                                                     
9 Credit default is defined as loans which are more than 90 days overdue with payments. ( Non-standard, 
Doubtful and Loss loan) 
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3. Banking regulation 
3.1. Banking regulation principles 
In this chapter the current banking regulation will be closely introduced. Focus will be 
directed on Basel II accords as a regulation which should create a buffer for unexpected 
events such as credit bubbles. 
The banking sector as it was illustrated in previous chapters is a special area of business, 
which is full of various risks and where appears to be significant informational asymmetry 
which leads to moral hazard issues. In reaction to this spectrum of issues, national and later 
international regulation has been established. Basel regulation is the first international 
regulation of the banking business. Before Basel regulation, there were significant 
discrepancy between regulation of East-Asia and UK. East-Asia banks didn’t have to make 
any regulatory capital as is the case of the UK. Neither was there any international institution 
which would coordinate regulation of domestic and international banks. After the entry of 
international banks to individual countries, question of its regulation arose. The question of 
equal conditions appears to be relevant in light of fair competition. This demand brought a 
Basel regulation and its Basel I accord which came into force in 1988, published and 
implemented by Basel Committee working closely with the Bank for International 
Settlements BIS. Basel committee has been established in 1974 and it consisted of central 
bank governors of G10. The first meeting was in 1975 and meetings are 3-4 times per year. 
Except for governors, the Basel committee consists of 25 working groups. Those groups meet 
on a regular basis. Basel regulation brought unification of capital adequacy rules and minimal 
capital requirements were set at 8 %.10 Basel I was focused exclusively on credit risks. 
 
In 1992 the Basel committee has introduced principles of international supervision 
[PANEK, 2005, pp.16] 
o International banking group is supervised by home country on consolidated basis, it 
relates to all its transactions around the world 
o Branch opening needs to be confirmed by home as well as host country 
o Institution of supervision at home country has a right to information about international 
banking  operations, which relate to its sphere of responsibility 
                                                     
10 In other words, bank has to cover 8 % of its provided loans by own capital. 
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o Supervisor of host country can impose a regulation on the foreign branch if it is not 
satisfied with supervision of home regulator. 
Basel I rules were extended in 1996 in a reaction to financial inventions. New capital 
requirements on market risks were added to Basel I and as well as capital requirements to 
operational risks. First version of Basel II was introduced in 1998. It was followed by several 
changes and final version was presented in July 2006. Basel II was accompanied by QIS 
(Quantitative Impact studies) [Bürgerová, 2007]. Nowadays, Basel Committee is preparing 
the third document, called Basel III accords. 
 
3.2. Basel II regulation 
Basel II brought a new way to calculate capital adequacy by adding operational risks. 
Market risk was already added to the calculation in 1996 [Penza and Bansal,2000]. Basel II is 
focused on three areas. Those are minimum capital requirements, supervision process and 
market discipline. Banks are required to follow these three pillars.  
3.2.1. Minimum capital requirements 
As it was discussed before, banks are highly leveraged depending highly on deposits. 
Together with a wide range of risks, banks are highly exposed to the possibility of bankruptcy. 
Since stability of too big to fail institutions is in public interest and state budgets have been 
used in many cases for bank bailouts, regulators have decided to set a minimum level of 
capital to cover potential asset losses (risk weighted assets). This capital should serve as a 
buffer against high losses of these institutions. These capital requirements are prescribed by 
Basel accords. In the reaction to Basel II pro-cyclicality of capital charges, according to 
Kashyap and Stein [2004], capital charges should be related to the state of the business cycle. 
Based on empirical work of Repullo and Suarez [2009], banks hold a higher capital buffer in 
boom than during recession, but as they point out, this buffer is insufficient to prevent 
significant contraction in the market. 
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Capital adequacy is calculated as follows: 
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 + (𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 ∗ 12.5) + (𝑂𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑝𝑟. ∗ 12.5) ∗ 0.08 
RWAcredit = capital requirements for credit risks 
MRCMarket*12.5 = capital requirements for market risks 
ORCOpr.*12.5 = capital requirements for operational risks 
 
Capital is calculated as 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟2 − 𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟3 
Where 
• Tier 1 – Core capital 
• Tier 2 – Additional capital 
• Tier 3 – Capital for market risk 
 
Tier 1 Equity capital issued & fully paid common stock 
  Non-cumulative, non redeemable preferred stock 
  Disclosed reserves 
  Excludes goodwill 
Tier 2 Undisclosed reserves 
  Assets revaluation reserves 
  General provisions or loan loss reserves (only in Tier 2) 
  Hybrid debt capital instruments (cumulative preffered stock) 
  Subordinated term debt 
Tier 3 Short-term subordinated debt 
  Maturity at least 2 years 
  
With covenant limiting payment it impairs bank's capital 
requirement 
 
Part of capital is not: 
Profit/Losses arising on revaluation of bank liabilities at fair value in connection with 
changes in bank credit risk (past and present) 
Gains and losses on hedging derivatives in cash flow hedges 
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There are available several approaches for calculation of capital requirements on credit, 
market and operational risks, as in §74 of CNB11 decree 123/2007. 
Capital requirements for credit risk are calculated either by the standardized approach or IRB 
approach (Internal Rating Based Approach)12. Due to possible choice, capital requirements 
are not fully comparable across the banking sector or countries. The standardized approach 
sets credit risk weights based on the type of debtor13 and credit rating14. Rating is assigned by 
rating agencies registered by central banks. On the other hand, IRB approaches which are 
developed by individual banks measure credit risks more accurately.  
The IRB approach is based on a formula of four risk components according to the Basel 
committee on banking supervision: 
𝑅𝑊𝐴 = 12.5 ∗ 𝐸𝐴𝐷 ∗ 𝐾 
EAD – Exposure at default (Adjusted exposure) 
 
Where K is function of 
𝐾 = 𝐿𝐺𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝐷 ∗ 𝑓(𝑀) 
LGD - Loss given default (1-Recovery rate) 
PD – Probability of default (expected default frequency) 
M – Maturity of exposure 
 
There are two types of IRB approaches. Those are Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB 
approach. In the Foundation IRB approach the bank gets to develop its own internal estimate 
of probability of default and the supervisor provides the other three components. The 
Advanced IRB approach can be used by an individual bank in case that bank is able to 
demonstrate that the criteria it uses are plausible or intuitive and that they are supported by 
evidence.  
Standard as well as IRB approaches for credit risk measurement are strongly pro-cyclical. 
The Standard approach is based on credit rating agencies. However, credit rating decisions 
are reactive and credit rating changes are correlated with actual default experience instead of 
predicting future development [Partnoy, 1999]. IRB approach due to calculation of 
                                                     
11 Czech National Bank 
12 The internal rating based approach 
13 Sovereign, Bank 1, Bank 2, Retail, Residential and Corporate. Bank 1 and Bank 2 are exposures to banks. 
Bank 2 option is selected if it is lend to headquarter of the bank. 
14Credit rating is provided by credit rating agencies. 
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probability of default is also reactive and is not able to predict a coming burst of the bubble. 
It is based on past data to predict future probability of default. 
Personally, I consider this as a weak part of financial regulation since capital requirements 
on credit risk should reflect charges on unexpected losses, but as described above it mostly 
makes charges on expected losses. Both approaches are cyclical as described above. No 
model can ever determine time of credit bubble burst, but in a period of economic growth, it 
is very probable that the credit bubble to some extent is on the market and its burst is just a 
question of time. Credit growth overwhelms GDP growth during a boom. Based on this, we 
can conclude that all financial institutions should create capital reserves in boom periods for 
extraordinary cases such as credit bubble burst. 
 
3.2.2. Probability of default (PD) 
Probability of default (PD) is very important variable in the model above. PD is the 
probability that a debtor will not be able to handle obligations during the repayment period. 
Since one bank is holding a huge number of obligations to various debtors, it is necessary to 
calculate the PD of the portfolio. The PD of the portfolio at particular time is calculated as the 
average of grade PDs weighted by the number of counterparties in each grade. 
Many papers deal with the issue of correct probability of default calculation, because the 
current system is very pro-cyclical and it is causing deepening of economic cycles as it was 
mentioned above. The method used in Basel II uses current probability of default while 
setting minimum capital requirements. This approach works very well in times of economic 
boom, because the very good outlook of economy promises very low probability of default 
and thus a lower need of capital requirements. This lower need of capital requirements boosts 
economy even more, since banks are allowed to lower the level of capital and lend even more. 
In the time of economic downturn, which inevitably comes, banks have higher banking losses 
due to higher level of defaults and they are pushed due to higher probability of default hold 
higher minimum capital requirements. Wrong judgment about future economic growth may 
then very easily bring the bank into financial trouble. The solution to this cyclicality could be 
using probability of default estimated for bank’s portfolios in downturn conditions 
[CEBS,2009] or to use noncyclical probability of default in IRB requirements through 
specific application of scalar that converts the outputs of bank’s underlying PD models into 
through-the-cycle estimates [UK FSA,2009]. 
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According to my view there could be theoretically created counter-cyclical adjustments for 
probability of default especially for industries which are very sensitive to economic cycles. 
This counter–cyclical adjustment could link to GDP growth or asset prices growth which in 
most cases is the best indicator of a bubble. Bubbles in asset markets are usually followed by 
strong economic contraction. There is also an alternative, which could be any kind of mixture 
between mentioned approaches and which would eliminate drawbacks of both variants.  
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4. Regulatory proposals 
The previous chapter discussed Basel II regulation and the consequences of new 
regulation. Following that, this chapter will introduce Basel III regulation, which was created 
to cope with the shortcomings of Basel II as well as with credit bubbles. However, there is no 
consensus among economists about regulatory proposals which should be applied. Apart 
from Basel III, it is necessary to take a look at complementary proposals such as introduction 
of statistical provision [Lis, Pagés, Saurina, 2000]. This proposal has been selected as one of 
the most important and promising regulatory reforms which could have fundamental impact 
on credit bubble recurrence if implemented. However, there are also other regulatory reform 
proposals that may have indirect impact on credit expansion such MIFID (Market in 
Financial Investment Directive) II, regulation of credit rating agencies, bank remuneration 
reform, mark to funding approach, new accounting standards, regulation of OTC derivatives, 
stress tests. Those regulatory reforms will not be discussed due to their limited and hardly 
predictable impact on credit bubbles. 
4.1. Basel III - comparison to Basel II15 
Basel III accords are the third regulation in line. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) published these new rules on 16 December 2010. Basel III accords were 
created as an answer to the financial crisis which emerged in 2008. They try to strengthen the 
global capital framework and introduce new global liquidity and leverage standards. Basel III 
is part of the Committee’s comprehensive reform package together with other measures 
focused on improvement of risk management, governance, transparency and disclosures. The 
objective of this new regulatory framework is to create a resilient banking sector and 
strengthen its ability to absorb future shocks and their spillover to the real economy. In 
reaction to these introduced measures, other institutions such as the European Commission, 
Financial Stability Board (FSB), Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) prepared specific legislative measures, interpretation 
of requirements and impact analysis.  
Basel III brings several new measures which are focusing on mitigation of weaknesses of 
Basel II framework and strengthening the stability of the banking sector. 
                                                     
15 The source for whole chapter is official document of BIS: Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems 
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There are two main areas of changes: 
4.1.1 Strengthening the global capital framework 
4.1.2 Introducing the global liquidity standards and leverage ratio: Liquidity Coverage 
ratio, Net Stable Funding ratio, Leverage ratio 
4.1.1. Strengthening the global capital framework 
This part of regulation targets the problems related to quality and quantity of capital base. 
 
“The crisis demonstrated that credit losses and writedowns come out of retained earnings, 
which is part of banks’ tangible common equity base. It also revealed the inconsistency in the 
definition of capital across jurisdictions and the lack of disclosure that would have enabled 
the market to fully assess and compare the quality of capital between institutions.” 
[Basel III, 2010] 
 
• Minimal capital requirements 
Basel III is strongly focused on strengthening capital requirements. There are several 
issues which are very challenging regulators abilities.  
Those issues are: how to set a) Elements of capital, b) Limits and minima, c) Probability of 
default (PD) 
 
a. Elements of capital 
Regarding this issue, several changes have been made between Basel II and Basel III 
accords. Regulatory capital should be newly consisting of the following elements: 
i. Tier 1 Capital (going-concern capital) consists of: 
a) Common Equity Tier 1 – common shares and retained earnings. 
b) Additional Tier 1 - instruments which are subordinated and have fully discretionary 
non-cumulative dividends or coupons and have neither a maturity date nor an incentive 
to redeem. Innovative hybrid instruments 16 which redeem through step up clauses, 
currently limited up to 15% of Tier 1, will be phased out. 
 
                                                     
16 Instruments, which are having cosine characteristics of shares and fixed interest products. Investors were in 
the case of bankruptcies settled up before shareholders but after bondholders.  
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ii. Tier 2 Capital (gone-concern capital) - It introduces a harmonization of instruments. 
The upper and lower sub-categories of Tier 2 capital are going to be eliminated. Instead, 
there will be one set of “entry criteria”17. [Oertel,2011] 
 
iii. Tier 3 Capital - in Basel II regulation Tier 3 capital was used to cover market risks. 
Tier 3 capital is now eliminated in Basel III regulation. 
 
b. Limits and minima 
In this section, Basel III introduces significant changes. Under new Basel III capital 
requirements, banks will need higher level of capital and better quality capital to risk 
weighted assets. Bankers are concerned about their future profitability. Generally equity 
capital is more expensive than debt capital, though bankers will have to achieve higher 
returns. On the other hand, politicians are concerned about impact on economic growth. 
Basel III requires a higher level of good quality capital as illustrated in the table below. 
 
Table 2: Regulatory capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems 
 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 + 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 2 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
 
Table 2 above presents capital requirements as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. 
Highlighted fields are obligatory minimal capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. As 
we can conclude, there is high pressure to increase Common Equity Tier 1 capital, 
representing the most stable and the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the bank. For 
                                                     
17 For entry criteria see APPENDIX F 
  
Common 
Equity 
Tier 1 
Additional 
Tier 1 
Minimum 
Tier 1 
capital 
Tier 2 
capital 
Total 
regulatory 
capital 
Basel II 2% 2% 4% 4% 8% 
Basel III 4.5%  1.5% 6% 2% 8% 
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banks the situation will be even more difficult, because the regulatory adjustments as 
presented in Basel III will be in most of cases deducted from common tier equity, instead of 
currently used Tier 1 or combination Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. This will increase the cost of 
adapting Basel III regulatory framework. 
 
• Capital conservation buffer 
Additionally to 8% of minimum capital requirement will be added a capital conservation 
buffer18 in good times. This will bring total common equity Tier 1 capital requirements to 7%. 
On the other hand, in time of financial distress, bank can draw on the buffer, however under 
condition to keep limit in earnings distribution as required by Basel III (bonuses and 
dividends). This buffer should help to cover losses coming from system-wide risk.  
As the following table illustrates, the proposed conservation buffer works on the principle 
of discrete bands. Based on the level of conservation buffer, bank will be allowed to 
distribute dividends, share buybacks and discretionary bonus payments. Those ranges are 
provisional and Bank for International Settlement plans to calibrate them. 
 
Table 3:  Individual bank minimum capital conservation standards (Numbers are illustrative and do not 
represent a proposed calibration level) 
Capital conservation range is established above the minimum requirement 
Amount by which a bank’s capital exceeds 
the minimum requirement in terms of a 
percentage of the size of the conservation 
range 
Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
[< 25%] [100%] 
[25% - 50%] [80%] 
[50% - 75%] [60%] 
[75% - 100%] [40%] 
[> 100%] [0%] 
Source: Countercyclical capital buffer proposal, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, July 2010 
 
A bank will have a choice to increase or decrease conservation buffer as necessary. 
However in time when the conservation buffer doesn’t reach 2.5 % to total risk weighted 
assets, a bank will be limited in the level of profit distribution. For example: in case that the 
bank conservation buffer is 1.6 % of total risk weighted assets, this particular bank will be 
allowed to distribute 60 % of their profit. 
 
                                                     
18 build of Common Equity Tier 1 
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• Countercyclical buffer 
This buffer serves to enhance cyclicality of credits to GDP growth. This buffer should 
vary between 0 and 2.5% to total risk weighted assets. As written by Basel Committee, it will 
apply to each bank reflecting geographical composition of its portfolio of credit exposures. 
Countercyclical buffer will consist of Common Equity Tier 1 or other fully absorbing capital 
or it will be subject to the restrictions on distributions. Basel Committee set a usage of 
countercyclical buffer like this. 
 
“For each jurisdiction, when the variable breached certain pre-defined thresholds this would 
give rise to a benchmark buffer requirement. This could then be used by national 
jurisdictions to expand the size of the capital conservation buffer.” [Repullo and Saurina, 
2011] 
 
National regulators would have the responsibility to decide about implementation. They will 
be in charge of monitoring indicators which may signal a build-up of system wide risk.19 The 
main signal is credit-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, if credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds its long term 
trend, by significant amount, bank regulators should use their own judgment and principles as 
stated in “Guidance for national operating the countercyclical capital buffer” to decide about 
countercyclical buffer implementation. Guidance consists of 5 principles such as follows20 
 
• Objectives – the only objective of this buffer is to protect the banking system against 
potential future losses. 
• Common reference guide – the credit/GDP guide is the main reference place 
• Risk of misleading signals – use professional judgment (possibility to use also the 
other indicators such as various asset prices, funding spreads and CDS spreads, credit 
condition surveys, real GDP growth and data on the non-financial entities to meet 
their debt obligations on a timely basis.)  
• Prompt release – fast response to stress may reduce the risk of the supply of credit 
• Other macroprudential tools – also alternative tools may be used such as loans to 
value limits, income gearing limits, sectoral capital buffers. 
 
                                                     
19 Association for Financial Markets in Europe: Briefing note: Counter-cyclical Capital Buffer [June,2011] 
20 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical 
capital buffer, [December 2010] 
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Decision about a countercyclical buffer should be performed quarterly or on a more 
frequent basis. This is based on the argument that most of the macroeconomic and financial 
information is released quarterly. 
 
Credit to GDP parameter has shown to be the best ratio to indicate increase in systematic 
risk. Other parameters as presented in principle 3: “Risk of misleading signals”21 are not fully 
reliable in all cases.  
 
Calculation of credit to GDP22 
 
This is done in three steps. 
1. Calculation of aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ratio 
2. Calculation of credit-to-GDP gap 
3. Transform the credit-to-GDP gap into the guide buffer add-on 
 
1. Calculation of aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ratio RATIOt = CREDITtGDPt ∗  100%  
GDPt is domestic GDP 
CREDITt is total credits to the private, non-financial sector. 
 
2. Calculation of credit-to-GDP gap GAPt = RATIOt –  TRENDt.  
“TREND is a simple way of approximating something that can be seen as a sustainable 
average of ratio of credit-to-GDP based on the historical experience of the given economy. 
While a simple moving average or a linear time trend could be used to establish the trend, the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter is used in this regime as it has the advantage that it tends to give 
higher weights to more recent observations. This is useful as such a feature is likely to be 
able to deal more effectively with structural breaks. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a standard 
mathematical tool used in macroeconomics to establish the trend of a variable over time. It is 
implemented in any statistical package such as EViews, but it is also available as an add-in 
                                                     
21 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Guidance for national authorities operating the 
countercyclical capital buffer [December, 2010] 
22 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical 
capital buffer, December 2010 
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in Excel. For the purposes of this regime a one sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a high 
smoothing parameter is used to establish the trend (TRENDt). Only information available at 
each point in time is used for the construction. The smoothing parameter, generally referred 
to as lambda in the technical literature, is set to 400,000 to capture the long-term trend in the 
behaviour of the credit/GDP ratio in each jurisdiction.” [Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, December 2010] 
 
 
3. Transform the credit-to-GDP gap into the guide buffer add-on 
Credit-to-GDP gap is going to be transformed to a countercyclical buffer in case it exceeds a 
certain threshold. 
There are two thresholds. The minimum threshold is called L and maximum threshold is 
called H. L is set at 2 and H is set at 10. 
Setting L=2 means that when: 
 
• ((CREDITt / GDPt ) Х 100% ) – (TRENDt) <2%, the buffer add-on is zero  
 
Setting H=10 means that when: 
 
• ((CREDITt / GDPt ) Х 100% ) – (TRENDt) >10%, the buffer add-on is at its 
maximum  
 
In case that credit-to-GDP gap will be between those two thresholds, countercyclical 
buffer will vary linearly between 0% and 2.5%. 
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Figure 4: Credit gaps in the Czech Republic with alternative 
denominators 
 
Source: [Seidler, 2012] 
Figure 2 illustrates development of Credit to GDP gap for the Czech Republic from 1998 
to 2008. Credit to GDP gap (actual period estimation) line is the gap as proposed by Basel III. 
It illustrates that the Czech Republic would reach excessive credit growth as early as 2004. In 
2008, the total Credit-to-GDP gap reached 10 percentage points. This implicates that banks 
would have to create a credit buffer amounting to 2.5 percent of risk weighted assets. If the 
financial crisis wouldn’t hit Czech economy, this trend of growing credit to GDP gap would 
continue, however Basel III would not be creating any additional buffer for this new 
systematic wide risk, because it already reached its maximum.  
The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is not elimination of economic cycles or assets 
prices. It should just create a capital buffer against potential future losses. It would be applied 
to all banks with the credit exposure in particular country, whether or not a particular bank 
contributed to the credit boom. After the announcement of the countercyclical buffer, a bank 
should have at least 12 month for capital buffer adoption. 
  
• Requirements for systematically important financial institutions (SIFI) (focusing on 
“too big to fail” issue) 
As it could be observed during the current financial crisis, the biggest financial institutions 
were taking advantage of their market position and became heavily leveraged. Economists 
such as Goldstein and Veron [2011] as well as many others argue that there are SIFI which 
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benefit from their position on the market. Other market participants consider those 
institutions as low risk institutions, because those institutions are offered bailout in case of 
financial distress wherefore they don’t disappear from the market. Therefore, institutions 
target SIFI institutions with risky investments and don’t require risk premiums related to their 
default.  Those banks have to be bailed out, because due to interconnectedness of financial 
institutions, “domino” effect could occur. It is arguable what would be the proper solution to 
solve this moral hazard. Measures concerning this issue are currently discussed and the 
results are expected to be announced in the near future. There is a proposal which introduces 
new capital surcharges for SIFI and introducing contingent capital or the so called “bail-in-
able” debt. Federal regulators in US have adopted a plan to increase a contribution of “Too 
big to fail” institutions to Deposit insurance fund [Dash, 2011].23 To sum it up, there are two 
different approaches. European regulation focuses on slowing growth of financial institution, 
on the other hand, US regulation requires participation of big institutions in incurred losses 
from bank bankruptcies. 
 
4.1.2. New global liquidity standards and leverage ratio 
In order to take into account liquidity risks connected with investments and credit 
exposures, the Basel Committee introduced harmonized global liquidity standards. Those 
standards will establish minimum requirements and try to mitigate competing in risk taking 
practices.  
Banking is a type of business, in which there is an enormous maturity mismatch of assets 
and liabilities compared to other businesses as already discussed in chapter 2. Their assets 
have long maturities due to the long-term character of investments while liabilities have a 
short-term character as they do mostly consist of deposits. This maturity time inconsistency 
makes banks very vulnerable to liquidity troubles. Those liquidity troubles can spill over in 
cases of market turbulence to solvency troubles, while banks need to sell their assets with 
haircuts. The behavior of the banking institution is affected by the upward sloping character 
of interest curve. This means that these institutions make profits from a spread between long-
term interest rate on assets and short-term interest rate on liabilities. To increase the spread, 
most banks do not hesitate to keep high level of maturity mismatches, because it allows them 
                                                     
23 It is planned that 110 biggest US bank would cover 80% of the amount paid to Deposit insurance fund. 
27 
 
to make high profits. After the beginning of the financial crisis 2008-2010, many regulators 
realized the problems of this paradigm.  
This behavior gives a fundament for new liquidity regulation as introduced by the Basel 
Committee. 
 
There were created two ratios to cover two main complementary objectives: 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio – ensuring bank survival of acute stress scenario lasting for one 
month; 
Net Stable Funding Ratio – for a time horizon of one year. Part of this measure is the 
creation of sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities.  
 
• Liquidity Coverage ratio [Powell and Kingsley, 2011] 
This LCR measure forces banks to hold high liquid assets in a quantity which would allow 
meeting its potential cash outflows over a 30 day stressed period. 
Below is a list of assumptions in a stress scenario for which an institution needs to have a 
sufficient unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets. 
 
o A significant downgrade of the institution’s public credit rating;  
 
o a partial loss of deposits;  
 
o a loss of unsecured wholesale funding;  
 
o a significant increase in secured funding haircuts; and  
 
o increases in derivative collateral calls and substantial calls on contractual and non-
contractual off-balance sheet exposures, including committed credit and liquidity 
facilities.  
 
The complete tree for calculation stock of high quality liquid assets and Net cash outflows 
over a 30 – day time period can be found on [Deloitte website]. 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑎 30 − 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 ≥  100% 
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• Net Stable Funding ratio 
There is a requirement from the NSFR to keep a minimum amount of stable sources of 
funding depending on the liquidity profile of the assets and off-balance sheet commitments in 
a horizon longer than one year. 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 >  100% 
 
There is no finalized shape of those measures, because the Basel Committee agreed to 
postpone adopting the standards to 2015 and 2018. Impact of those measures will be assessed 
during an observation period. 
 
• Leverage ratio 
The last, but not least important measure is leverage ratio which is focused on dealing with 
the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. Some 
banks presented their strong risk based capital ratios while they build up excessive leverage. 
The main goal of this ratio is to minimize deleveraging process as well as reinforce the risk-
based capital adequacy requirements. The committee will test a minimum Tier 1 leverage 
ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. All off-balance sheet positions24 will have 100% 
credit conversion factor (CCF), not as in BASEL II ranging from 0% to 100%. Off-balance 
sheet positions which are unconditionally cancelable will have 10 % CCF. This regulation 
prohibits the use of collateral, guarantees, credit derivatives and all other forms of credit risk 
mitigation to reduce on-balance sheet exposures. 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟 1 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙/𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 > 3% 
Note: Intangible assets include goodwill, software expenses, and deferred tax assets. 
 
                                                     
24 commitments to lend (including liquidity facilities), direct credit substitutions, acceptances, standby letters of 
credit and trade letters of credit  
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4.2. Statistical provision 
The current system of loan loss provision creates provisions on expected losses. It is in 
line with accounting principles. Statistical provision is discussed by Lis, Pagés, Saurina 
[2000].  
This approach provokes a discussion if it should be accounted for credit losses which 
could relate to credit bubbles, so if it should take into account also unexpected losses.  
This approach is also different to countercyclical buffer, because it focuses on creating 
loan-loss provisions which are booked directly to P/L. On the other hand, the countercyclical 
buffer increases capital requirements to credit risk25. This provision is an extra component to 
ordinary loan-loss provisions which was already discussed in chapter 1.  
Banco de Espana implemented this provision in 2000 in order to cope with decrease in 
credit risk on Spanish banks balance sheet. Except Spain, this measure is also implemented in 
Peru, Columbia and Uruguay.  Statistical loan loss provision is used in only those 4 countries. 
According to [Saurina, July 2009], Spain had the lowest ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
loans among OECD countries in 1999.  Also correlation between GDP growth and provision 
ratio was exceptionally high, reaching 0.97 for period 1991-1999. Decrease in credit risk led 
to extensive credit growth. This measure intended to make banks more conservative.  
Specific loan-loss provisions and its calculation vary among countries and so compare to 
Spanish approach there would have to be some changes before application of statistical 
provision in other countries. However, this provision could be applicable in its basic principal 
anywhere. Its principal is based on comparison of latent risk and specific provision. 
 
Coefficients for standard approach in Spain see below [Lis, Pagés, Saurina  2000]: 
 
1. without risk (0%): those risks involving the public sector; 
2. low risk (0.1%): mortgages with outstanding risk below 80% of the property value as 
well as risks with firms whose long-term debts are rated at least A; 
3. medium-low risk (0.4%): financial leases and other collateralised risks (different from 
the former in point 2); 
4. medium risk (0.6%): risks not mentioned in other points; 
5. medium-high risk (1%): personal credits to finance purchases of durable consumer 
goods; 
                                                     
25 Discussed in section about Basel III 
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6. high risk (1.5%): credit card balances, current account overdrafts and credit account 
excesses 
 
These coefficients are multiplied by the exposure to calculate latent risk measure 
 
𝐿𝑟 = 𝑠 ∗ 𝐿 
Where s – average coefficient 
 L- total amount of loans  Annual provision: StP =  Lr –  SP 
Where SP – Specific provision SF =  e ∗ M 
 
Where: M - stands for problem loans and  
    e  -  parameter 
 Annual provision: SP =  e ∗ �M 
 
If SP < Lr (low problem loans) => StP > 0 (building up of the statistical fund) 
If SP> Lr (high problem loans) => StP < 0 (depletion of the statistical fund) 
Balance of the statistical fund: StF = StPt + StFt-1, with a limit:0 ≤ 𝑆𝑡𝐹 ≤  3 ∗ Lr  
Annual total provision consisted of general, specific provision and statistical provision.  
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5. Critical assessment of new regulatory proposals 
In the previous chapters Basel II and new regulatory proposals, mainly Basel III were 
introduced. In this chapter possible impacts of Basel III on capital buffer to systematic risks 
are identified and discussed.  
 
5.1. Basel III 
Basel III introduces several changes. Although impacts of changes are difficult to measure, 
the author assesses those measures and points out strong and weak parts of regulation. The 
following table illustrates a summary of the main regulatory changes introduced in Basel III. 
 
Table 4: Extra regulatory capital 
  Basel II Basel III 
  
Common 
Equity 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Total 
Capital 
Common 
Equity 
Tier 1 
Capital Total Capital 
Minimum 
requirements 2% 4% 8% 4.5% 6% 8% 
Additional capital 
conservation buffer Not applicable 2.5%     
Additional 
countercyclical buffer Not applicable 0-2.5%     
Leverage ratio Not applicable 
May be added to the other risk-
weighted requirements 
Additional 
requirements for 
systemically important 
financial institutions Not applicable 
May be added to the other risk-
weighted requirements 
Source: Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems [Basel III, 2010] 
 
There are worries of politicians and central bankers about impacts of the new implemented 
measures. This is the reason why those measures are going to be implemented gradually and 
impacts are going to be closely monitored. 
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1) Increase in quality of regulatory capital 
This measure targets strengthening the quality of capital which would have positive 
impact on bank stability in case of credit crunch. However, this measure does not target to 
cope with credit expansion. It could slightly increase the price of loans which could reduce 
credit expansion. Czech banks already hold on average sufficient amount of good quality 
capital as presented on Figure 7, so for most of them no extra charges required. 
 
2) Increase in regulatory capital 
Increase in the level of regulatory capital will not directly influence credit bubbles. Banks 
will hold higher level of capital to cover eventual losses, but it doesn’t motivate banks to 
limit credit expansion. It makes credits slightly more expensive, but Czech banks already 
keep a sufficient capital buffer, so there can’t be expected any significant impact on credit 
expansion in the Czech Republic.  
On the graph below we can see development of regulatory capital in the Czech banking 
sector. Czech banks hold very high and good quality capital. Despite the maximal increase of 
regulatory capital as possible in Basel III, Czech banks on average would not have to increase 
their capital. 
Figure 5: Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets in Czech Republic 
 
Source: data from CNB website- Základní ukazatele o bankovním sektoru, Author’s own graph  
 
There are banks which would need extra capital as can be seen at Figure 6 below. 
However, due to their proportion of total RWA, those banks are very small and insignificant. 
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Figure 6: Capital adequacy to total RWA 
 
Source: data from CNB website, Základní ukazatele o bankovním sektoru 
 
3) Conservation buffer 
This measure creates a capital buffer for stress scenarios. The concept of this measure is 
very logical and has a very elegant form. It will press banks to keep conservation buffer 
which they may anytime release, if credit losses appear. However, it doesn’t influence the 
size of the credit bubble and so it will not have a massive protective impact. It has positive 
impacts on stability of banking sector; however its total impact is hard to measure. The only 
threat could be a moral hazard related to excessive risk taking, because banks will have an 
extra buffer which they can release anytime. 
 
4) Countercyclical buffer 
This is the only measure which targets directly credit bubbles and mitigation of their 
impacts on banks. As discussed, it should create a buffer which would protect banks in time 
of economic downturn and deleveraging. It stands on credit to GDP gap (Gap between short 
term development and long term trend) as the main indicator of credit bubbles. As discussed, 
long term trend is calculated by using Hodrick-Prescott filter. This measure should be further 
tested, because there are several threats, which could emerge. The author sees the main issue 
in implementation. Countercyclical buffer is not mandatory, but it depends on the regulators’ 
professional judgment. Rising countercyclical buffer would increase the price of loans and 
could undermine economic growth. It should reconsider independence of central banks in 
individual countries as well as targets of central banks ( FED targets are price stability as well 
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as GDP growth). This measure is also limited to an extent of up to 2.5% in case that credit-to-
GDP gap reaches 10%. However, economic cycles vary in their intensity and so this buffer 
could appear to be insufficient in case of a severe financial crisis such as the current one. This 
opinion can be supported by recalculated countercyclical buffer by [Seidler,2012] on the 
Figure 4. This Figure illustrates that the Czech Republic would reach upper limit of 
countercyclical buffer in 2007. However, Credit to GDP gap continued to increase in 2008 
and it would most likely continue to grow, if the financial crisis would not emerge. This 
increase in credit to GDP gap would cause increase in systematic wide risk, but 
countercyclical buffer already reached its maximum level in 2007. Countercyclical buffer as 
presented, doesn’t take into account the length of economic cycle and the size of system wide 
risk is related to it. This can be seen as the weak side of this regulation. 
Further, there are issues related to countercyclical buffer calculation. The main indicator 
for countercyclical buffer usage is credit-to-GDP gap. As it was described on the page 23, 
credit-to-GDP gap is the difference between the particular credit to GDP ratio and its trend. 
This is based on the assumption that there exists a long-term equilibrium to which all 
economies converge. However, as historical data show credit growth exceeds GDP growth in 
all countries which raises the  question if credit-to-GDP ratio converge to some point or will 
raise to infinite. As assumed, increase of this ratio increases the systematic risk due to two 
reasons. Firstly, the banking sector is becoming more important in particular in economy, 
increasing the number of banks, which become “too big to fail”. Secondly, this rise in ratio 
can hide a credit bubble. 
However, there are also other issues related to calculation of countercyclical buffer. First 
relates to usage of Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, as discussed in paper from [Siedler,2012]. 
Hodrick Prescott filter is significantly dependable on the length of the chosen time series26. 
The other factor according to Seidler [2012] is that the calculation is very sensitive to 
smoothing parameter lambda. The last issue is related to “end-point bias”. This makes Trend 
to be highly affected by the most current data. This can highly affect results and calculated 
buffer. He argues that it could be better to use out-of-sample technique. This would be based 
on estimation for advanced EU countries. Those countries are used to calculate the 
equilibrium credit levels of the CEE countries. 
 
 
                                                     
26 There are very short time series for Czech Republic. 
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New Countercyclical buffer proposal27 
Personally, I venture to suggest changes to countercyclical buffer. As Lis, Pagés, Saurina 
[2000] showed in their work for Spain, there is a strong relationship between loan growth and 
GDP growth. Loan growth is faster than GDP growth during boom and vice versa. It can be 
assumed that any loan growth faster than GDP growth increase system wide risk to some 
extent. Therefore, based on the authors’ opinion, countercyclical buffer calculation should 
reflect relationship between loan and GDP growth. Calculation of the countercyclical buffer 
would be based on a simple three-step calculation. 
 
1. Calculation of excessive loan growth: 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ − 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
Where: 
Loan growth – percentage loan growth of particular bank 
GDP growth – nominal GDP growth 
 
2. Calculation of Coefficient 
𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 0.1 
Where: 
Coefficient – would be defined as Loan to GDP ratio * 0.1 
This constant was set based on the reasonability of Coefficient analysis. Coefficient should be 
calibrated further based on the bank stress test in different periods of economic cycle and it 
should be analyzed ability of introduced capital buffer to cover system wide risk. The author 
considers estimation of system wide risk as a very complicated issue, which requires a 
significant dataset not publicly available. 
 
3. Calculation of countercyclical buffer: 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
 
 
                                                     
27 Author’s idea 
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Charges increase would be depending on excessive loan growth and loan to GDP ratio 
development. It could be further analyzed and discussed if the constant is set appropriately. 
Credit bubble burst is unexpected risk, because its probability and impact is hardly if at all 
possible to measure. However, based on experiences of the current financial crisis it could 
become clearer if those charges would be sufficient.  
I do not have any data about unexpected credit risk for individual years. Furthermore, my 
analysis is focused on reasonability of its impact and scope. 
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Table 5: Analysis of coefficient 
  CGEXP GDP 
Excessive 
loan 
growth Coefficient 
Regulatory 
capital 
change 
Counter 
cyclical 
buffer 
Impact 
on GDP 
1996 7,95 4,54 3,41 0,053 0,180 0,180 0,036 
1997 26,04 -0,85 26,89 0,053 1,427 1,607 0,321 
1998 -0,17 -0,24 0,07 0,049 0,003 1,610 0,322 
1999 -4 1,68 -5,68 0,044 -0,249 1,361 0,272 
2000 -2,31 4,19 -6,5 0,036 -0,232 1,129 0,226 
2001 -10,31 3,1 -13,41 0,038 -0,505 0,624 0,125 
2002 -5,28 2,15 -7,43 0,035 -0,258 0,366 0,073 
2003 6,54 3,77 2,77 0,037 0,103 0,469 0,094 
2004 6,26 4,74 1,52 0,037 0,056 0,525 0,105 
2005 16,66 6,75 9,91 0,038 0,373 0,898 0,180 
2006 19,89 7,02 12,87 0,042 0,547 1,445 0,289 
2007 26,25 5,74 20,51 0,049 1,009 2,454 0,491 
2008 16,35 3,1 13,25 0,053 0,703 3,157 0,631 
2009 1,27 -4,7 5,97 0,055 0,327 3,484 0,697 
2010 3,46 2,74 0,72 0,056 0,040 3,524 0,705 
Total 108,6 43,73 64,87   3,524   4,566 
 
Source: columns CGEXP and GDP recalculated from CNB and CSU data, other columns own calculation 
based on first two columns. 
 
Column CGEXP represents credit growth and column GDP represents GDP growth. 
Based on those data Excessive loan growth (CGEXP-GDP) was calculated. In the second step 
change of countercyclical buffer (Regulatory capital change) was calculated28. The column 
Cumulative regulatory capital illustrates what would be the countercyclical buffer for 
individual years. 
Macroeconomic Assessment group [Vinals (IMF), 2010, pp.38] estimated that 1 
percentage point increase in the required ratio of capital relative to risk-weighted assets 
(TCE/RWA) would cause reduction in real GDP by less than 0.2%. 
On the other hand, the second IMF group focusing on long-term economic impact [Vinals 
(IMF), 2010, pp.38] estimated that 1 percentage point in capital adequacy requirements 
would reduce real GDP only by about 0.1%.  
                                                     
28 Excessive credit growth*coefficient 
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Based on these studies I have calculated expected impact of changes in regulatory capital 
on GDP. Due to prudency I have chosen higher impact (1 percentage point increase in 
regulatory capital would cause decrease by 0.2 percentage points of real GDP growth) 
estimated by the first working group. Based on this model regulatory capital would increase 
by 3.5 percentage points in last 14 years, the cumulative impact on real GDP growth would 
be 4.5 percentage points. The impact seems to be not significant and for the Czech Republic 
would be even lower due to high average regulatory capital held by banks.  
There would be a positive impact on cyclicality, because banks would be obliged to keep a  
higher level of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. 
On the graph below it is visible that although a financial crisis emerged in 2008, the 
countercyclical buffer didn’t decrease. It is due to a delay in which GDP growth affects loan 
growth. 
Figure 7: Countercyclical buffer charges 
 
Source: own production, based on data from CNB and CSU 
 
In the graph above the countercyclical buffer development is well visible. Its increase is in 
line with credit expansion and related credit risk. In long-term development loan growth 
overwhelms GDP growth and so this measure would constantly tend to raise capital 
requirements. However, this means that the whole economy is leveraging which based on the 
author’s judgment increase systematic credit risk. There are significant differences between 
developments of financial services. Low developed financial markets would suffer by a high 
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level of regulatory requirements, although their loan to GDP ratio and to it related systematic 
risk would be lower than in high developed financial markets. I consider countries with high 
loan to GDP leverage more risky than vice versa, so those countries should create higher 
capital requirements to systematic credit risks. This is solved by using Loan to GDP ratio 
during coefficient calculation.  
 
5) Requirements for systematically important institutions (too big to fail issue)  
This measure could have a slight effect on leveraging of financial institutions and limit 
their credit expansion since it would cost them additional regulatory capital. U.S. plans to 
implement an extra premium to Deposit insurance fund for such institutions. Neither of the 
measures would be most likely a sufficient motive to reduce credit bubbles.  
6) Liquidity coverage ratio and Net stable funding ratio 
These measures are focused on mitigation of liquidity risk as discussed before. In case of 
insufficient liquidity buffer, banks would have to limit their credit expansion. However, until 
a bank is in liquidity distress, liquidity is not usually a limiting factor for loan expansion, 
because funds may be easily borrowed from depositors or on interbank market. It implies that 
this will not have any significant impact on credit bubbles. 
 
7) Leverage ratio 
This measure targets to include off-balance sheet position to risk considerations. It is much 
more prudent than Basel II and so it will have deleveraging tendency. Impact of this measure 
will be closely monitored by BIS. It could to some extent limit off-balance sheet credit 
exposure, however the impact of this measure is difficult to predict. It doesn’t limit on-
balance sheet exposure which is considered as credit expansion creating credit bubbles in this 
work. 
 
5.2. Probability of default 
As discussed in the chapter about Basel II, probability of default is the probability that the 
debtor will not be able to pay back their debt. Probability of default is highly procyclical, 
causing Basel II to be procyclical. As it was already discussed, probability of default varies 
based on business cycle. Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) proposed a 
change in probability of default (PD) estimation. PD would be estimated for a bank’s 
portfolios in downturn conditions. This is a similar proposal to the proposal of UK Financial 
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Services Authority (FSA) which comes up with through-the-cycle-estimates. This measure 
limits credit expansion by making loans more expensive. Increase in probability of default 
would increase the risk weighted assets which would require more of additional capital to 
hold against them. This measure is however just in the sphere of consideration and not 
introduced in Basel III accords. On the other hand, this is the other way which may reach the 
same goal as the author’s countercyclical buffer proposal. 
 
5.3. Statistical provision 
Statistical provision is solves cyclicality of loans and GDP from a different perspective 
than Basel III. It does it despite the PL account. It is the third way on how to dissolve 
cyclicality of loan growth to GDP growth. Introduction to statistical provision as well as 
increase in regulatory capital would increase costs of loans for banking institutions, 
decreasing their profitability. The question is which would be more suitable to be applied. As 
it was discussed in the first chapter there are expected and unexpected risks. There are two 
reasons why it is more appropriate to use regulatory capital instead of loan-loss provisions. 
Firstly, despite credit bubbles recurrence, this risk is considered to be unexpected, because it 
is not possible to set probability of its occurrence. Accounting should present true and fair 
information about an accounting unit (in this case financial institution). This would not be 
applied if statistical provision is going to be implemented, because statistical provision would 
be based on making loan-loss provisions on credit bubbles and could cause earnings 
management. Due to missing probability of occurrence and size of bubble, these provisions 
would be probably very inaccurate and it could disrupt fair and true view of financial 
statements. Accounting profit could be significantly distorted which would significantly 
affect explanatory power of accounting.  
On the other hand, this measure was tried in Spain. It didn’t significantly decrease loan-
loss provision cyclicality to GDP growth, but it helped to create an extra buffer for a coming 
financial crisis since 2008. According to PWC [April, 2012], Spanish banks had the highest 
provision to non-performing loans ratio among Western European countries in 2006, which is 
very helpful during financial crisis. On the other hand, there are some critics from PWC and 
other accountancies. They criticize unclear approach to booking and reversing a loss, 
potential changes in credit risk are not recognized on a timely basis, expected loss is not 
reflected in effective interest rate [PWC, April 2012]. Analysis of possible impacts on Czech 
banks, if this provision is implemented is not provided since necessary data for calculation 
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are not available. Statistical provision is an interesting concept, which helps to banks to create 
reserves for unexpected risk. The main disadvantage of this measure is its distortion of 
accounting principle. Therefore, the author would propose to stay with a countercyclical 
capital buffer. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this work was to assess the ability of Basel III accords to create a buffer to 
systematic risk implied by recurrent credit bubbles.  New regulatory measures were critically 
discussed. 
Defining the exact impact of those measures is very complicated if possible. The primary 
focus of the analysis was if those new measures are countercyclical or not and how 
significant an impact they may have. Significant measures for analysis have appeared to be 
mainly conservation and countercyclical buffer as part of Basel III. However, relevant to 
discussion is also statistical provision.  
Conservation buffer is an elegant measure, because it helps to create and dissolve capital 
as needed. Banks will be allowed to use this buffer according to their judgment when they 
will experience credit losses. There appears to be only an issue related to moral hazard. 
Banks may count on this extra buffer and it may enter more risky projects and create higher 
systematic credit risk. 
The second measure, a countercyclical buffer is prepared in detail. There appear to be 
several issues. The first issue may be seen in independency of regulators. Countercyclical 
buffer will affect economic growth and so some regulators may feel reluctant to use it, in 
order to protect economic growth. This measure would be more effective if it would be 
mandatory for all countries and not depending. Differences in regulator approaches wouldn’t 
hurt competitiveness of the banking sector, because also foreign banks with exposures in a 
particular country would be affected. However, competitiveness of domestic exporting 
companies could be weakened. Banks providing loans to domestic companies would have to 
keep an extra capital buffer to those risk weighted assets (loans). Equity capital is more 
expensive than debt capital; therefore banks would have to increase interest rate to achieve 
required profitability. Borrowing costs for domestic companies would be higher than for 
foreign competitors which would create unfair competition environment. The second issue 
may be seen in the buffer extent. Its maximum reach 2.5 % of risk weighted assets. It should 
be tested if this would be enough in time of deep systematic crisis such as the current one. 
The third issue is related to its calculation. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is used. Results could 
be significantly affected by length of time series, by parameter lambda and end-point bias.  
The last issue which the author sees in the calculation of the countercyclical buffer is a 
dependence on Loan-to-GDP trend. This trend is constantly growing based on historical data. 
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The author assumes that excessive leverage of economy based on high level of Loan-to-GDP 
increases a systematic risk and therefore, a special buffer should be created to those risks.  
The third measure discussed is statistical provision. This measure could significantly 
eliminated true and fair view of accounting and so its implementation should be very deeply 
analyzed. 
In the last part of this work we introduce a new measure, which is focused on different 
approach which could be used while considering a countercyclical buffer. It is a proposal 
which should be further critically discussed and analyzed. It would be countercyclical and it 
would create a capital buffer in time when credit growth exceeds GDP growth, what implies 
increase in system-wide risk. While this measure will reduce loan expansion; it will have a 
negative impact on GDP growth. Any effective measure focused on creating a sufficient 
buffer or credit bubble mitigation will always have a negative impact on GDP growth. 
At the end, the work has also critically examined another proposal. One such proposal 
comes from Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). CEBS proposes to 
estimate probability of default as for downturn conditions. This measure seems to be relevant. 
If implemented, it would have similar impacts as my proposal of a countercyclical buffer. 
However, regulatory capital requirements wouldn’t decrease in time of economic downturn 
as in my proposal. It wouldn’t help to economic recovery since probability of default 
wouldn’t change during the cycle. There would have to be an additional clause related to 
capital buffer resolution in time of credit losses. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Overview of bank assets to GDP for Eurozone countries + Czech Republic 
  
Number 
of Credit 
Institutions 
Total 
Assets 
(€ 
billion) 
as % of 
National 
GDP 
Average 
Asset Size 
(€ billion 
per bank) 
Share of 
Euro-16 
Total 
Assets 
Nominal 
GDP 
(€ billion) 
Share of 
Euro-16 
GDP 
Austria 803 1071,9 380% 1,335 3,40% 281,9 3,00% 
Belgium 105 1276,3 370% 12,155 4,00% 344,7 3,70% 
Cyprus 163 118,1 685% 0,725 0,40% 17,2 0,20% 
Finland 357 396,2 215% 1,11 1,20% 184,2 2,00% 
France 728 7710,6 395% 10,591 24,20% 1950,1 21,10% 
Germany 1989 7892,7 316% 3,968 24,70% 2495,8 27,00% 
Greece 66 464,5 194% 7,038 1,50% 239,1 2,60% 
Ireland 501 1731,5 952% 3,456 5,40% 181,8 2,00% 
Italy 818 3687,7 235% 4,508 11,60% 1567,9 16,90% 
Luxembourg 153 1271,8 3232% 8,312 4,00% 39,3 0,40% 
Malta 23 42,3 743% 1,839 0,10% 5,7 0,10% 
Netherlands 302 2231,5 374% 7,389 7,00% 595,9 6,40% 
Portugal 175 482,1 290% 2,755 1,50% 166,4 1,80% 
Spain 362 3409,4 313% 9,418 10,70% 1088,5 11,80% 
Slovakia 26 65,5 101% 2,519 0,20% 64,8 0,70% 
Slovenia 25 49 132% 1,96 0,20% 37,1 0,40% 
Euro Area 6596 31901,1 344% 4,836 100% 9260,4 100% 
Czech 
republic29 37 150,1848 105% 4,059 0,5% 142,9 2% 
Source: European Central Bank statistics 
  
                                                     
29 Source: CNB and CSU, exchange rate for recalculation of banking assets and GDP was used 26,93CZK/Euro 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Data for credit growth to GDP growth regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CNB and CSU 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
Data for Default on credit rate to GDP growth and Unemployment rate regression 
year 
Default on credits 
rate Real GDP growth Unemployment rate 
2003 6.4 3.8 7.8 
2004 4.9 4.7 8.3 
2005 4.1 6.8 7.9 
2006 3.6 7.0 7.1 
2007 2.6 5.7 5.3 
2008 3.2 3.1 4.4 
2009 5.2 -4.7 6.7 
2010 6.2 2.7 7.3 
Source: CNB and CSU 
 
year CGEXP GDP 
1996 7.95 4.54 
1997 26.04 -0.85 
1998 -0.17 -0.24 
1999 -4.00 1.68 
2000 -2.31 4.19 
2001 -10.31 3.10 
2002 -5.28 2.15 
2003 6.54 3.77 
2004 6.26 4.74 
2005 16.66 6.75 
2006 19.89 7.02 
2007 26.25 5.74 
2008 16.35 3.10 
2009 1.27 -4.70 
2010 3.46 2.74 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 Balance sheet of Czech banking sector 
Assets   Liabilities   
Cash and cash 
equivalents 40,308.10 
Total deposits and loans 
received 3,449,143.20 
Total deposits and 
loans 3,177,258.80 
Deposits and loans from 
central banks 3,501.30 
Deposits and loans 
with central bank 388,385.30 
Deposits and loans from other 
banks 531,687.70 
Deposits and loans 
with other banks 484,402.40 
Deposits and loans from 
customers 2,913,954.20 
Loans and other 
receivables with 
customers 2,304,471.10 
Issued non-marketable debt 
securities 72,397.20 
Non-traded debt 
securities 18,562.20 
Debentures and other debt 
securities 307,653.50 
Other debt securities 930,300.40 Total capital and reserves 504,380.00 
Mutual fund shares of 
money market 0 Out of which: Adjustments 84,805.70 
Other shares and 
equity investments 
held by banks 92,379.40 
Out of which: Total basic 
capital 84,969.00 
Fixed assets 113,051.90 
Out of which: Retain profit 
or loss  -85.1 
Other assets 239,315.40 
Out of which:  Current year 
profit or loss 53,299.40 
Of which: Positive real 
value of derivatives 162,861.20 Other liabilities 277,602.40 
    
Out of which: Negative real 
value of derivatives 150,318.90 
Total Assets 4,611,176.30 Total Liabilities 4,611,176.30 
Source: CNB database ARAD 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Phased implementation of the key Basel III components (excluding the possible buffers 
for SIFIs and counter-cyclical elements) 
 
Source: [Oertel, 2011] 
 
APPENDIX F 
 
Criteria for inclusion in Tier 1 Additional Going Concern Capital.  
The main criteria include:  
>Subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated debt (rather than having to be “the 
most subordinated claim”, as required of Common Equity which appears to allow Tier 1 Additional 
Going Concern Capital instruments to rank senior to common equity and pari passu with preference 
shares).  
> No maturity date; no incentives to redeem or other “innovative” features.  
> Callable at the initiative of the firm only after a minimum of five years subject to:  
> prior supervisory approval;  
> the firm not creating an expectation that the call will be exercised; and  
> the firm not exercising a call unless the called instrument is replaced with capital of the same or 
better quality or the firm demonstrating that its capital position is well above the minimum capital 
requirements after the call is exercised.  
> The firm must have full discretion to cancel distributions/payments. Such cancellation of 
distributions/payments must not impose restrictions on the firm except in relation to distributions to 
common stockholders (but see below regarding not hindering recapitalisation).  
> Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items.  
> Instruments classified as liabilities must have principal loss absorption through either (i) conversion 
to common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point or (ii) a write-down mechanism which 
allocates losses to the instrument at a pre-specified trigger point.  
> The instrument cannot have any features that hinder recapitalisation.  
 
Criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital.  
The main criteria include:  
> Subordinated to depositors and general creditors.  
> Minimum original maturity of at least five years, no incentives to redeem.  
49 
 
> Recognition in regulatory capital in the remaining five years before maturity will be amortised on a 
straight line basis.  
> Callable at the initiative of the firm only after a minimum of five years subject to:  
> prior supervisory approval;  
> the firm not creating an expectation that the call will be exercised; and  
> the firm not exercising a call unless the called instrument is replaced with capital of the same or 
better quality or the firm demonstrating that its capital position is well above the minimum capital 
requirements after the call is exercised.  
> The investor must have no rights to accelerate the repayment of future scheduled payments 
(coupon or principal) except in liquidation.  
 
Source: [Oertel, 2011] 
  
50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
  
51 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
ALLEN, Franklin  and SANTOMERO, Anthony M. The Theory of Financial Intermediation. 
Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol. 11, 1997, pp. 1461-85. 
 
ASSOCIATION FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE. Briefing note: Counter-
cyclical Capital Buffer. [online]. June 2011 [cit. 2012-09-23]. Available from: 
www.afme.eu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=118 
 
Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems. 
Bank for International Settlements: Banking Committee on Banking Supervision [online]. 
2010 [cit. 2012-05-15]. ISBN: 92-9131-859-0. Available from: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf  
 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. The Internal Ratings-Based 
Approach. [online].January 2011 [cit. 2012-06-04]. Available from: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf 
 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Countercyclical capital buffer 
proposal. [online]. July 2010 [cit. 2012-09-23]. ISBN 92-9197-833-7. Available 
from: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs172.pdf 
 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION. Guidance for national authorities 
operating the countercyclical capital buffer. [online]. December 2010 [cit. 2012-09-23]. 
ISBN 92-9197-865-5. Available from: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs187.pdf 
 
BRYANT, John. A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 43, 1980, pp. 749-61. 
 
BÜRGEROVÁ, Jiřina. Role interního auditu při implementaci Basel II. [online]. 2007 [cit. 
2012-06-10]. Available from: http://nf.vse.cz/download/veda/workshops/  
 
CECCHETTI, Stephen G, MOHANTY, M S and ZAMPOLLI, Fabrizio. The real effects of 
debt. [online]. September 2011 [cit. 2012-10-02]. Available from: https://docs.google.com/  
 
ČESKÁ NÁRODNÍ BANKA. Základní ukazatele o bankovním sektoru [online]. 2012 [cit. 
2012-07-28]. Available from: 
http://www.cnb.cz/cs/dohled_financni_trh/souhrnne_informace_fin_trhy/zakladni_ukazatele_
fin_trhu/banky/index.html  
 
ČESKÁ NÁRODNÍ BANKA. Jak by zvládly české banky návrat recese do Evropy? [online]. 
2012 [cit. 2012-05-21]. Available from: 
http://www.cnb.cz/cs/faq/jak_jsou_na_tom_banky.html  
 
ČESKÁ NÁRODNÍ BANKA. ARAD databáze [online]. [cit. 2012-05-01]. Available from: 
http://www.cnb.cz/cnb/STAT.ARADY_PKG.PARAMETRY_SESTAVY?p_sestuid=7317&
p_strid=ABBAA&p_lang=CS  
 
52 
 
ČESKÝ STATISTICKÝ ÚŘAD. M000101c HDP výrobní metodou (ceny roku 2005) 
[online]. [cit. 2012-06-28]. Available from: 
http://apl.czso.cz/pll/rocenka/rocenkavyber.makroek_prod 
 
Comittee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Position paper on a countercyclical 
capital buffer. [online] 2009 [cit. 2012-04-15]. Available from: 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/getdoc/715bc0f9-7af9-47d9-98a8-778a4d20a880/CEBS-position-
paper-on-a-countercyclical-capital-b.aspx, p.16 
 
DASH, Eric. Big Banks to Pay More to Insure Deposits [online]. The New York Times, 2011 
[cit. 2012-03-05]. Available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/business/08fdic.html?_r=2 
 
DIAMOND, W. Douglas, and DYBVIG, Phillip H. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and 
Liquidity. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, 1983, pp. 401-19. 
 
FOND POJIŠTĚNÍ VKLADŮ. Rok 2011 přinesl větší ochranu vkladů a nárůst počtu bank 
[online]. 2012. [cit. 2012-03-10]. Available from: http://www.fpv.cz/cs/aktuality/rok-2011-
prinesl-vetsi-ochranu-vkladu-a-narust-poctu-bank.html  
 
GOLDSMITH, Raymond. W. Financial Structure and Development [online]. New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1969. [cit. 2012-02-20] Available from: 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2230134?uid=3737856&uid=2129&uid=2&uid=70&u
id=4&sid=21100948539583 
 
GOLDSTEIN, Morris and VÉRON, Nicolas. Too Big to Fail: The Transatlantic Debate. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics [online]. 2011 [cit. 2012-03-28]. Available 
from: http://piie.com/publications/wp/wp11-2.pdf 
 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Reappraisal of the Federal Reserve Discount 
Mechanism. Washington, D.C., 1972, Vol. 3, pp. 95-136. 
 
HOLMSTROM, Bengt and TIROLE, Jean. Financial Intermediation. Loanable Funds and 
the Real Sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, August 1997, pp. 663-691. 
 
HOOKS, Linda M., and ROBINSON, Kenneth J. 2002. Deposit Insurance and Moral 
Hazard: Evidence from Texas Banking in the 1920s. Journal of Economic History 62(3) 
(September): pp. 833-53 
 
JÍLEK, Josef. Finanční rizika. Praha: Grada Publishing, spol. s.r.o., 2000. ISBN 80-7169-
579-3, pp. 15-98 
 
KASHYAP, A. and STEIN, J. Cyclical Implications of Basel II Capital Standards. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Economic Perspectives, 1st Quarter 2004, pp. 18-31. 
 
KIRSCHBAUM, Erik. Suicides Have Greeks on Edge Before Election. [online]. Reuters 
28.4.2012 [cit. 2012-02-15] Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/28/us-
greece-election-suicide-idUSBRE83R08N20120428  
 
53 
 
LEVINE, Ross. Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda [online]. 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, 1997 [cit. 2012-05-07] p.668. Available from: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2729790  
 
STRETTON, Catherine. Liquidity Coverage Ratio. DELOITTE. [online]. January 2011 [cit. 
2012-08-14]. Available from: http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
SouthAfrica/Local%20Assets/Documents/5.%20Basel%20flyer%20-%20LCR.pdf  
 
LIS, Santiago Fernández de, PAGÉS, Jorge Martínez and SAURINA, Jesús. Credit Growth, 
Problem Loans And Credit Risk Provisioning in Spain [online] Banco de España, 2000 [cit. 
2012-04-10] Available from: 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/Documento
sTrabajo/00/Fic/dt0018e.pdf 
 
OERTEL, Frank Peter. Basel III: Capital Changes[online] Linklaters 2011 [cit. 2012-02-15] 
Available from: http://frank-oertel-math.de/On_Basel_III_Feb_2011.pdf 
 
OHTAKE, Fumio. Unemployment and Happiness [online] Japan Labor Review, Spring 2012, 
No. 2 [cit. 2012-02-01] Available from: 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/JLR/documents/2012/JLR34_ohtake.pdf  
 
PANEK, D. Bankovní regulace a dohled. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2005. str. 36. ISBN 
80-210-3660-5 
 
PARTNOY, Frank. The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies [online] Washington University Law Quarterly,1999, No. 3 [cit. 
2012-02-27] Available from: http://www.publicassets.us/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Two_Thumbs_Down_for_Credit_Rating_Agencies-Portnoy-
1999.pdf  
PATEL, Vandana Singhvi. Central Banks and Asset Bubbles: A Perspective. Economic and 
Political Weekly, Vol XLV, No 18, May 1-7, 2010 
PENZA, Pietro and BANSAL, Vipul K. Measuring Market Risk with Value at Risk (Wiley 
Series in Financial Engineering, 2000).ISBN 0-471-39313-4, p.48 . 
 
POWELL, Stephen and KINGSLEY, Ben. The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio: 
Implications for Corporate Borrowers. [online] Slaugther and May, 2011 [cit. 2012-04-19] 
Available from: http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1682903/financing-briefing-the-
basel-iii-liquidity-coverage-ratio-implications-for-corporate-borrowers.pdf  
 
PRICE WATERHOUSE COOPERS. Dynamic Provisioning. [online]. April 2012 [cit. 2012-
10-05]. Available at: 
http://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/152073/Axisa_Fabio.pdf 
 
REPULLO, R. and SUAREZ, J. The Procyclical Effects of Basel II. CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. 6862, 2009 
 
54 
 
REPULLO, Rafael a SAURINA, Jesús. The Countercyclical Capital Buffer of Basel III.: A 
Critical Assessment [online] 2011 [cit. 2012-05-14] Available from: 
ftp://ftp.cemfi.es/pdf/papers/repullo/Repullo-Saurina%20Final%20R.pdf  
 
ROGOFF, Kenneth. World Economic Outlook. Growth and Institutions [online] IMF, April 
2003 [cit. 2012-03-08]. ISSN 0251-6365. Available from: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/pdf/front.pdf  
 
SAURINA, Jesús. Dynamic Provisioning [online]. July 2009[cit. 2012-10-05]. Crisis 
response, 7. Available from: http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/CrisisResponse/Note7.pdf  
 
 
SCHOLTENS, Bert and WENSVEEN, Dick Van. The Theory of Financial  Intermediation. 
[online] Vienna: SUERF, 2003. p. 7 , ISBN 3-902109-15-7. [cit. 2012-03-15] Available from: 
http://www.suerf.org/download/studies/study20031.pdf  
 
SEIDLER, Jakub. Credit Risk in the Macroprudential Framework: Three Essays. July, 2012, 
Prague. Available from: ies.fsv.cuni.cz/default/file/download/id/20838. Dissertation. Charles 
University in Prague. Vedoucí práce prof. Ing. Oldřich Dědek, CSc. 
 
SIEGELMAN, Peter. Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat. 
[online] Fordham School of Law, Pub-Law Research Paper No. 27. July 31, 2003. [cit. 2012-
05-06] Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=434604 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.434604 
 
TVERSKY, A.and KAHNEMAN, D. Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, 1991, pp. 1039-1061 
UK FSA’s note Variable Scalar Approaches to Estimating Through the cycle PDs (February 
2009) Available from: www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/variable_scalars.pdf 
 
VIÑALS, José. Global Financial Stability Report—Executive Summary and Chapter I. 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: Monetary and Capital Markets Department 
[online] 2010 [cit. 2012-04-05].  
 
Zátěžové testy EBA: Banky potřebují 115 miliard eur kapitálu. Erste 743 milionů, přišel 
negativní výhled S&P. [online] PATRIA ONLINE, 2011 [cit. 2012-07-12] Available from: 
http://www.patria.cz/zpravodajstvi/1966096/zatezove-testy-eba-banky-potrebuji-115-miliard-
eur-kapitalu-erste-743-milionu-prisel-negativni-vyhled-s-p.html  
 
 
 
